What is a concept? Some scholars have defined a concept as "a building block of thought".

What is the structure of that building block? What is is "made out of"? How can we represent that structure in abstract symbolic terms -- such as words and letters and symbols?

In this Closed Loop project, we are exploring ways that concepts can be constructed from "synthetic dimensions". We propose to "build concepts" by defining them as algebraic structures constructed from synthetic dimensions.

Are we saying that people have a library of algebraic dimensions in their brains, by which they define all concepts? The answer to that question is -- let's talk about it. Maybe yes, maybe no, maybe it varies from person to person.

A synthetic dimension is a recursively defined dimension, such that its values -- its "units" -- can be composite and "multi-dimensional " objects, such as "apple" or "beautiful", rather than simple linear units, such as "1 inch".

The term "property" can be understood as a synonym for "synthetic dimension". This is also true for other related terms, such as "characteristic" or "attribute" or "quality".

We are proposing to build concepts out of synthetic dimensions, by defining a concept as an intersect of dimensions. This is workable because the values of a synthetic dimension are complex constructed objects rather than simple linear values. In this way, we could use synthetic dimensions to construct the abstract conceptual object "beautiful 10 inch apple pie". That dimensional intersect would be our "concept."

What is a pie? What is an apple? What is beautiful?

Each of those questions can be answered by values in dimensions. Employing dimensional descriptions, all objects that are "pies" can be distinguished from all objects that are "not pies", such as horses or cakes.

how can concepts be defined as constructed from dimensions?

What does it mean to speak of the "digital integration of conceptual form"?

We are proposing to model actual human behavior in digital terms

• We are creating a definition of "concept" that we believe is consistent with cognitive psychology and philosophy
• We are not saying that people think in terms of "digital structures"

Sat, May 8, 2021

Without concepts, mental life would be chaotic. If we perceived each entity as unique, we would be overwhelmed by the sheer diversity of what we experience and unable to remember more than a minute fraction of what we encounter. And if each individual entity needed a distinct name, our language would be staggeringly complex and communication virtually impossible. Fortunately, though, we do not perceive, remember, and talk about each object and event as unique, but rather as an instance of a class or concept that we already know something about. When entering a new room, we experience one particular object as a member of the class of chairs, another as an instance of desks, and so on. Concepts thus give our world stability.

They capture the notion that many objects or events are alike in some important respects, and hence can be thought about and responded to in ways we have already mastered. Concepts also allow us to go beyond the information given; for once we have assigned an entity to a class on the basis of its perceptible attributes, we can then infer some of its nonperceptible attributes. Having used perceptible properties like color and shape to decide an object is an apple, we can infer the object has a core that is currently invisible but that will make its presence known as soon as we bite into it. In short, concepts are critical for perceiving, remembering, talking and thinking about objects and events in the world.

http://originresearch.com/docs/SmithAndMedin.docx

http://originresearch.com/docs/SmithAndMedin.docx

Concepts are the building blocks of thoughts. Consequently, they are crucial to such psychological processes as categorization, inference, memory, learning, and decision-making. This much is relatively uncontroversial.

But the nature of concepts—the kind of things concepts are—and the constraints that govern a theory of concepts have been the subject of much debate (Margolis & Laurence 1999, Margolis & Laurence 2015). This is due, at least in part, to the fact that disputes about concepts often reflect deeply opposing approaches to the study of the mind, to language, and even to philosophy itself.

In this entry, we provide an overview of theories of concepts, and outline some of the disputes that have shaped debates surrounding the nature of concepts.

The entry is organized around five significant issues that are focal points for many theories of concepts. Not every theory of concepts takes a stand on each of the five, but viewed collectively these issues show why the theory of concepts has been such a rich and lively topic in recent years. The five issues are: (1) the ontology of concepts, (2) the structure of concepts, (3) empiricism and nativism about concepts, (4) concepts and natural language, and (5) concepts and conceptual analysis.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/concepts/