Closed Loop Interval Ontology
 CLOSED LOOP INTERVAL ONTOLOGY        The Digital Integration of Conceptual Form
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Aligning the vision

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Ethics / governance / science

Homeostatic governance

Idealized democracy

Reconciliation and integration

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How do we know?

How meaning is created

Foundational recursive definition

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The closed loop ensemble contains
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What is a number?

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Primary terms

Closed Loop framework

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Euclid in digital space

Foundational method

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The integrated science of mind

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In the beginning

Domain and universal

A design proposal

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Science, philosophy and math
are defined in concepts

What is a universal container?
Set of all sets?

 We are proposing the Closed Loop as a "universal container" for all mathematical objects and semantic constructs. What are the more traditional approaches to this question, and how can we learn from them, and make sure we understand their concern? How, if at all, can we transcend their limitations? Why and how does the closed loop model escape the limitations of these more classical models?

 What is a universal container? Set of all sets - Universal Set We might be exploring the possibility that the "twist" in the Closed Loop is a way to overcome the challenges of universal sets and of Russell's paradox. Sun, Mar 14, 2021 Reference In set theory, a universal set is a set which contains all objects, including itself. In set theory as usually formulated, the conception of a universal set leads to Russell's paradox and is consequently not allowed. However, some non-standard variants of set theory include a universal set. Notation There is no standard notation for the universal set of a given set theory. Common symbols include V, U and ?.[citation needed] Reasons for nonexistence Many set theories do not allow for the existence of a universal set. For example, it is directly contradicted by the axioms such as the axiom of regularity and its existence would imply inconsistencies. The standard Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory is instead based on the cumulative hierarchy. Russell's paradox Main article: Russell's paradox Theories of universality The difficulties associated with a universal set can be avoided either by using a variant of set theory in which the axiom of comprehension is restricted in some way, or by using a universal object that is not considered to be a set. Restricted comprehension There are set theories known to be consistent (if the usual set theory is consistent) in which the universal set V does exist (and {\displaystyle V\in V}V\in V is true). In these theories, Zermelo's axiom of comprehension does not hold in general, and the axiom of comprehension of naive set theory is restricted in a different way. A set theory containing a universal set is necessarily a non-well-founded set theory. The most widely studied set theory with a universal set is Willard Van Orman Quine's New Foundations. Alonzo Church and Arnold Oberschelp also published work on such set theories. Church speculated that his theory might be extended in a manner consistent with Quine's,but this is not possible for Oberschelp's, since in it the singleton function is provably a set,[4] which leads immediately to paradox in New Foundations. Another example is positive set theory, where the axiom of comprehension is restricted to hold only for the positive formulas (formulas that do not contain negations). Such set theories are motivated by notions of closure in topology. Universal objects that are not sets Main article: Universe (mathematics) The idea of a universal set seems intuitively desirable in the Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, particularly because most versions of this theory do allow the use of quantifiers over all sets (see universal quantifier). One way of allowing an object that behaves similarly to a universal set, without creating paradoxes, is to describe V and similar large collections as proper classes rather than as sets. One difference between a universal set and a universal class is that the universal class does not contain itself, because proper classes cannot be elements of other classes.[citation needed] Russell's paradox does not apply in these theories because the axiom of comprehension operates on sets, not on classes. The category of sets can also be considered to be a universal object that is, again, not itself a set. It has all sets as elements, and also includes arrows for all functions from one set to another. Again, it does not contain itself, because it is not itself a set.

 Russell's Paradox Russell's paradox (also known as Russell's antinomy), discovered by Bertrand Russell in 1901, showed that some attempted formalizations of the naïve set theory created by Georg Cantor led to a contradiction. Russell’s paradox Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) was involved in an ambitious project to rewrite all the truths of mathematics in the language of sets. In fact, what he was trying to do was show that all of mathematics could be derived as the logical consequences of some basic principles using sets. At this time (around 1900), it was generally believed that any property of objects could define a set. For example, the property “x is a natural number between four and seven” defines the set {4, 5, 6, 7}. We could also write this set as {x| x is a natural number between 4 and 7}. What was believed was precisely that for any property “P” that you can think of, it made sense to talk about the set {x| x has property P}. Certainly, sets that consist of numbers make sense this way. But when you allow any objects in your sets, you can run into trouble. Russell was the first one to notice this. Russell’s insight was the following. First, it is possible for a set to be an element of itself. (Remember that elements are the objects which make up the set, e.g. the number 4 is an element of the set {4, 5, 6, 7}). An example of a set which is an element of itself is {x| x is a set and x has at least one element}. This set contains itself, because it is a set with at least one element. Using this knowledge, Russell defined a special set, which we’ll call “R”. R is the set {x| x is a set and x is not an element of itself}. Russell then asked: is R an element of the set R? Let’s think about this question. If R is an element of R, that exactly means that it is an element of itself. Which means that it can’t possibly be in R - by definition R is the collection of all sets which are not elements of themselves. Since this option is impossible, we must agree that R is not an element of R. But in that case, R is not an element of itself, so by definition it belongs to the collection of sets which are not elements of themselves. Uh-oh! [It is worth pausing a minute here and reassessing the situation on your own. Do you believe that R is an element of R or not? Neither? What’s the problem?] Mathematicians and logicians thought for a while that the problem with the set R was going to undermine their whole project to do all mathematics in terms of set theory. Fortunately, they eventually came up with a technical solution that changes the way sets are constructed (slightly) and prevents R from being considered a set (whew!). This technical solution is why you sometimes see a set being described in the form {x ? X| x has property P}, where “X” is supposed to denote some other set, or “the universe” (whatever that means!) We won’t worry about that issue in our class, as most of our sets will be sets of numbers and these are always safe. So did Russell succeed? Yes and no. The program to do all mathematics in terms of set theory was the birth of modern day logic, a rich and exciting area of mathematics. But ultimately, the logician Kurt G¨odel showed that the original goal of the project – to deduce all mathematics from some axioms (rules) concerning sets – was itself mathematically impossible! For more details on this story, I recommend the excellent book Logicomix by Doxiades and Papadimitriou. You may be delighted to know that a) it’s a graphic novel and b) the Reg library has a copy. Sun, Mar 28, 2021 Reference In the foundations of mathematics, Russell's paradox (also known as Russell's antinomy), discovered by Bertrand Russell in 1901,[1][2] showed that some attempted formalizations of the naive set theory created by Georg Cantor led to a contradiction. The same paradox had been discovered in 1899 by Ernst Zermelo[3] but he did not publish the idea, which remained known only to David Hilbert, Edmund Husserl, and other members of the University of Göttingen. At the end of the 1890s Cantor himself had already realized that his definition would lead to a contradiction, which he told Hilbert and Richard Dedekind by letter.[4] According to naive set theory, any definable collection is a set. Let R be the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. If R is not a member of itself, then its definition dictates that it must contain itself, and if it contains itself, then it contradicts its own definition as the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. This contradiction is Russell's paradox. Symbolically: {\displaystyle {\text{Let }}R=\{x\mid x\not \in x\}{\text{, then }}R\in R\iff R\not \in R}{\text{Let }}R=\{x\mid x\not \in x\}{\text{, then }}R\in R\iff R\not \in R In 1908, two ways of avoiding the paradox were proposed: Russell's type theory and the Zermelo set theory. Zermelo's axioms went well beyond Gottlob Frege's axioms of extensionality and unlimited set abstraction; as the first constructed axiomatic set theory, it evolved into the now-standard Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory (ZFC). The essential difference between Russell's and Zermelo's solution to the paradox is that Zermelo altered the axioms of set theory while preserving the logical language in which they are expressed, while Russell altered the logical language itself. The language of ZFC, with the help of Thoralf Skolem, turned out to be first-order logic.[5]