How meaning is created
We are exploring the construction of meaning.
- How is meaning intended?
- How is meaning assigned in a context-specific way?
- How do human beings "make a point"?
Following the principles of synthetic dimensionality -- the dimensionality of qualitative variables and values -- we propose that meaning is stipulated and intended by a speaker or communicator, in a cascade of implicit definitions that form a dimensional intersect, creating a "point" as the objective of the communication/statement.
Intention: "I mean ...X..."
We are investigating the intersection of qualitative dimensions.
We are proposing that the intention of language is to "make points", and that a "point", as we understand it in natural language, can be understood as a dimensional intersect when the dimensions are or may be qualitative rather than quantitative.
Every part of a sentence can be represented in synthetic dimensions
All parts of speech can be represented by (constructed from/in terms of) synthetic dimensions
We want to create a consistent way to define all the basic elements of speech, following a semantics of intentional stipulation combined with interpretation from expected common usage.
Meaning is stipulated by human intention in a context-specific top-down intentional cascade. This is a powerful and important principle.
"who how why what where when"
All of those phrases refer to bounded ranges of value, and by intentional stipulation, "I specify what they are when I refer to those dimensions."
"When I speak to you, I define the meaning of those terms in this particular immediate context -- while of course remaining aware of how you most likely understand those words, based on my understanding of a) common public meaning and b) dictionary definitions and c) my personal knowledge of you."
Part of speech
In traditional grammar, a part of speech or part-of-speech (abbreviated as POS or PoS) is a category of words (or, more generally, of lexical items) that have similar grammatical properties. Words that are assigned to the same part of speech generally display similar syntactic behavior—they play similar roles within the grammatical structure of sentences—and sometimes similar morphology in that they undergo inflection for similar properties.
Commonly listed English parts of speech are noun, verb, adjective, adverb, pronoun, preposition, conjunction, interjection, numeral, article, or determiner. Other Indo-European languages also have essentially all these word classes; one exception to this generalization is that Latin, Sanskrit and most Slavic languages do not have articles. Beyond the Indo-European family, such other European languages as Hungarian and Finnish, both of which belong to the Uralic family, completely lack prepositions or have only very few of them; rather, they have postpositions.
Other terms than part of speech—particularly in modern linguistic classifications, which often make more precise distinctions than the traditional scheme does—include word class, lexical class, and lexical category. Some authors restrict the term lexical category to refer only to a particular type of syntactic category; for them the term excludes those parts of speech that are considered to be functional, such as pronouns. The term form class is also used, although this has various conflicting definitions. Word classes may be classified as open or closed: open classes (like nouns, verbs and adjectives) acquire new members constantly, while closed classes (such as pronouns and conjunctions) acquire new members infrequently, if at all.
Almost all languages have the word classes noun and verb, but beyond these two there are significant variations among different languages.
Sat, Mar 20, 2021
A noun names an object
How do we know whether the named object really is what it is being called?
Everything can be defined by boundary values
and I suspect, every proper noun as well -- a proper noun name exactly one specific thing
Sat, Mar 20, 2021
A noun (from Latin n?men, literally name) is a word that functions as the name of a specific object or set of objects, such as living creatures, places, actions, qualities, states of existence, or ideas.[note 1] However, noun is not a semantic category, so it cannot be characterized in terms of its meaning. Thus, actions and states of existence can also be expressed by verbs, qualities by adjectives, and places by adverbs. Linguistically, a noun is a member of a large, open part of speech whose members can occur as the main word in the subject of a clause, the object of a verb, or the object of a preposition.
Lexical categories (parts of speech) are defined in terms of the ways in which their members combine with other kinds of expressions. The syntactic rules for nouns differ from language to language. In English, nouns are those words which can occur with articles and attributive adjectives and can function as the head of a noun phrase. "As far as we know, every language makes a grammatical distinction that looks like a noun verb distinction."
A verb, from the Latin verbum meaning word, is a word (part of speech) that in syntax conveys an action (bring, read, walk, run, learn), an occurrence (happen, become), or a state of being (be, exist, stand). In the usual description of English, the basic form, with or without the particle to, is the infinitive. In many languages, verbs are inflected (modified in form) to encode tense, aspect, mood, and voice. A verb may also agree with the person, gender or number of some of its arguments, such as its subject, or object. Verbs have tenses: present, to indicate that an action is being carried out; past, to indicate that an action has been done; future, to indicate that an action will be done
Sat, Mar 20, 2021
Abstract object, concrete object
Most of the mathematics we are exploring has to do with abstract objects -- by which we mean some symbolic representation -- usually in an alphabet -- and actually existing in some medium -- such as words written on printed on a piece of paper.
Is a generalization or "universal" an abstract object? I would say yes, in that its only concrete actuality/reality is that it points to a class of specific objects -- which in some cases might also be abstract or universal
Fri, Mar 26, 2021
In metaphysics, the distinction between abstract and concrete refers to a divide between two types of entities. Many philosophers hold that this difference has fundamental metaphysical significance. Examples of concrete objects include plants, human beings and planets while things like numbers, sets and propositions are abstract objects. There is no general consensus as to what the characteristic marks of concreteness and abstractness are. Popular suggestions include defining the distinction in terms of the difference between (1) existence inside or outside space-time, (2) having causes and effects or not, (3) having contingent or necessary existence, (4) being particular or universal and (5) belonging to either the physical or the mental realm or to neither. Despite this diversity of views, there is broad agreement concerning most objects as to whether they are abstract or concrete. So under most interpretations, all these views would agree that, for example, plants are concrete objects while numbers are abstract objects.
Abstract objects are most commonly used in philosophy and semantics. They are sometimes called abstracta in contrast to concreta. The term abstract object is said to have been coined by Willard Van Orman Quine. Abstract object theory is a discipline that studies the nature and role of abstract objects. It holds that properties can be related to objects in two ways: through exemplification and through encoding. Concrete objects exemplify their properties while abstract objects merely encode them. This approach is also known as the dual copula strategy.
The type–token distinction identifies physical objects that are tokens of a particular type of thing. The "type" of which it is a part is in itself an abstract object. The abstract–concrete distinction is often introduced and initially understood in terms of paradigmatic examples of objects of each kind:
Cascaded stipulative definition
This idea is essential to understanding how meaning is "assigned".
- It is created by humane intention
- It is defined in cascading levels of abstraction -- from broader inclusive categories to narrower
- This definition is stipulative, and "assigned" by the intending person/speaker
- It is context specific
- Because word meaning in most or all cases is subject to misinterpretation because it is not rigid and its implications are too broad, human beings can and do "drill down" across levels of specificity until an "acceptable" level of understanding is reached.
This below Wikipedia definition and discussion of stipulation does not represent this idea very clearly, and presumes that "the dictionary definition" can realistically be assumed to be authoritative. In the real world of context-specific human conversation, this is not the reality. It might work in Scrabble to resolve disputes, but not in real human relationship or negotiations.
Thu, May 6, 2021
A stipulative definition is a type of definition in which a new or currently existing term is given a new specific meaning for the purposes of argument or discussion in a given context. When the term already exists, this definition may, but does not necessarily, contradict the dictionary (lexical) definition of the term. Because of this, a stipulative definition cannot be "correct" or "incorrect"; it can only differ from other definitions, but it can be useful for its intended purpose.
For example, in the riddle of induction by Nelson Goodman, "grue" was stipulated to be "a property of an object that makes it appear green if observed before some future time t, and blue if observed afterward". "Grue" has no meaning in standard English; therefore, Goodman created the new term and gave it a stipulative definition.
On stipulative definitions Stipulative definitions of existing terms are useful in making theoretical arguments, or stating specific cases. For example:
Suppose we say that to love someone is to be willing to die for that person. Take "human" to mean any member of the species Homo sapiens. For the purposes of argument, we will define a "student" to be "a person under 18 enrolled in a local school". Some of these are also precising definitions, a subtype of stipulative definition that may not contradict but only extend the lexical definition of a term. Theoretical definitions, used extensively in science and philosophy, are similar in some ways to stipulative definitions (although theoretical definitions are somewhat normative, more like persuasive definitions).
Many holders of controversial and highly charged opinions use stipulative definitions in order to attach the emotional or other connotations of a word to the meaning they would like to give it; for example, defining "murder" as "the killing of any living thing for any reason". The other side of such an argument is likely to use a different stipulative definition for the same term: "the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought" or "the premeditated killing of a human being". The lexical definition in such a case is likely to fall somewhere in between.
When a stipulative definition is confused with a lexical definition within an argument there is a risk of equivocation.
Acceptable error tolerance
An acceptable error tolerance is a bounded range -- from lower to higher in some range of values.
bounded range of values
The semantics of meaning involves error tolerance in stipulated dimensions.
negotiation also involves acceptable error tolerance
You say you are going to paint the house grey. What shade of grey?
Sun, Apr 4, 2021
Making a point 2
This seems extremely natural and totally intuitive. Nothing hard or counter-intuitive about it.
Think about "points" -- and the idea that the objective of natural language is to "make a point."
Now -- what is a point?
Start intuitive and holistic. Think
- Bullet point
- Power Point
- Point in Cartesian (N-dimensional) space
The argument is -- the objective in human speech is to make points -- which means to definitively locate a point in an n-dimensional space where the dimensionality is not restricted to quantitative values. Red and green can be values. Beautiful can be a value. Good or bad can be a value. Over there can be a value.
So -- this theory of semantics says that when a person clearly makes a point in natural human language, they assert enough dimensional specificity to firmly/unambiguously locate a point in the N-dimensional space.
It's not actually a single point in that space -- it's an enclosed bounded range in N dimensions.
It's in an "envelope" -- it's a bounded range in n-dimensions, where some of the dimensions are qualitative and some maybe quantitative. But there might be meaning for a single point as "central" to that bounded range -- maybe that one single point finds the "optimal" or "most centered" balance in all those dimensions, thus somehow most ideally representing that (composite) point.
It's approximate -- not precisely defined. It has an "acceptable error error tolerance." It has a range for interpretation -- and the potential for further refinement and a higher degree of precision, if that is what we want or need.
(no need to get hung up in fuzzy logic, or the theory of metaphors or various competing theories of category formation. this is easy)
Sat, Apr 17, 2021
Making a point
We define a set in terms of boundary values in dimensions. A set is all the points or objects that are constrained by the intersection of the defining dimensions.
So a set is created by the intersection of multiple dimensions... [?]
Ordinarily, a set is any collection of elements -- put together for any reason
When somebody is "making a point" in a sentence, we want to look at the question of how that sentence or paragraph or composite of semantic elements combine to establish a "point" in abstract space that is significant.
This is what I want to talk about...
Let's say that normal common conversation is generally conducted in "synthetic dimensions" -- some of which might be "quantitative" -- but most of which is usually not.
So we want to make the argument that
- The object of speech /language is to make a point -- to make points
- So we are talking in a complex array of usually-qualitative dimensions
- We have generally agreed on the innate/inherent dimensionality of the words we use -- whether they are verbs or nouns
- So we compile these nested distinctions into (linear - sequential) strings -- and then intersect these dimensions
- The "point we are making" is a point constrained within the intersection of the simultaneous dimensionality we just invoked
What makes that point "significant"? Why does it "matter"?
We know these things instinctively, and we use these ideas every day.
But how does it actually work?
We say this "point" is an intersect like a Venn diagram in synthetic dimensional values
These values are complex objects defined in boundary value ranges
These dimensions are a range of values - and we specify those dimensions, and the values we want to affirm for those dimensions
And we include several of them in "making a point"
If we specify five qualitative dimensions, we define the point in those five dimensions -- each one of which is qualitatively defined in a range, and which combine in an intersect which established this "point" at the intersect of these dimensions and the values we have assigned/stipulated
The argument for semantics is
Human conversation and writing is intended to "make points" -- as in "what is your point?"
If you are vague and confused -- your comments are "pointless"
"What is the point of doing this?"
Fri, Apr 16, 2021
The Closed Loop is a "constructivist" project. We are "building stuff" - from pieces that we put together to form composite systems and "wholes". One thing we are building is "concepts". What are concepts made out of?
A "primitive" or a "primitive notion" is supposedly a lowest-level object or element from which abstract ideas can be/are/should be constructed.
Mon, May 10, 2021
In mathematics, logic, philosophy, and formal systems, a primitive notion is a concept that is not defined in terms of previously-defined concepts. It is often motivated informally, usually by an appeal to intuition and everyday experience. In an axiomatic theory, relations between primitive notions are restricted by axioms. Some authors refer to the latter as "defining" primitive notions by one or more axioms, but this can be misleading. Formal theories cannot dispense with primitive notions, under pain of infinite regress (per the regress problem).
For example, in contemporary geometry, point, line, and contains are some primitive notions. Instead of attempting to define them, their interplay is ruled (in Hilbert's axiom system) by axioms like "For every two points there exists a line that contains them both".